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I DID NOT WANT TO KILL HIM BUT
THOUGHT I HAD TO: IN LIGHT OF PENRY
II’S* INTERPRETATION OF BLYSTONE,**
WHY THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES JURY
INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO GIVE EFFECT
TO RELEVANT MITIGATING EVIDENCE IN
CAPITAL CASES
David Barron***
“We were drowning and we wanted some kind of help.
And when it’s that serious for God’s sakes,
when you’re pleading for help, you have to give us something,
we were reasonable people, intelligent people, making a very
difficult decision, asking for help.”1

* Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001). Textually and in short citation
form, this case is referred to as Penry II. The first Supreme Court opinion
concerning John Paul Penry’s capital case is referred to as Penry I. See Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
** Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990).
*** Brooklyn Law School Class of 2003; B.A., Boston College 2000.
The author wishes to thank attorney Robert Brett Dunham for providing the
insight and inspiration for this article and attorneys John H. Blume and Jerome
H. Nickerson for exemplifying everything the author would like to become
both as a lawyer and a person. The author also wishes to thank Professors
Ursula Bentele, Michael Madow and Daniel Medwed of Brooklyn Law School
for their advice and support throughout law school. Finally, the author wishes
to thank the members of the Journal of Law and Policy for their editorial
advice, and my close friends of whom there are too many to name
individually, for their support in everything and putting up with my obsession
with the death penalty. The author also wishes to acknowledge all lawyers
currently representing death row inmates.
1
See Alan Berlow, A Jury of Your Peers? Only if You’re Clueless,
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INTRODUCTION
Death is unique because of its irrevocability.2 Therefore, one
of the most important decisions a person can make is whether
another individual should live or die.3 Although mistaken
decisions could cost people their lives, throughout history juries
have been free to impose the death penalty on any individual
convicted of a capital crime who they believed deserved a
sentence of death.4 Over the past thirty years, however, the
Supreme Court has placed restrictions on who can be sentenced
to death.5 In doing so, the Supreme Court clearly stated that only
very serious crimes such as murder permit the jury to impose a
death sentence.6 As a result, the Supreme Court imposed

WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2002, at B1; Alan Berlow, Deadly Decisions, Juror
Confusion, AM. RADIO WORKS (Aug. 2002) [hereinafter Berlow, Deadly
Decisions] (quoting Fred Baca, the jury foreman in the 1982 Texas capital
murder trial of Bobby Moore), at http://www.americanradioworks.org/
features/deadlydecisions/confusion_print.html. Baca’s comments were made in
response to his experience as a juror, particularly in reference to questions the
jury asked the judge pertaining to the definition of mitigation. Id. These
questions went unanswered throughout the deliberations. Id. This confusion
resulted in Bobby Moore receiving a death sentence that he may not have
received otherwise. Id.
2
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (discussing the need for
reliability in capital cases because of the finality of the sentence).
3
See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383 (1988) (“The decision to
exercise the power of the State to execute a defendant is unlike any other
decision citizens and public officials are called upon to make.”).
4
See Bureau of Prisons, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT. PRISONER STAT.
NO. 32, Executions 1962-1963, reprinted in Hugo Adam Bedau, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA 113-15 (Anchor Books, 1964). Between 1930 and 1944,
New York, Georgia, North Carolina, Texas and California accounted for a
total of 908 executions. Id.
5
See generally THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Hugo Adam Bedau,
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1982) (discussing the evolution of the death
penalty in the United States).
6
See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding the death penalty
for rape unconstitutional on the basis that a death sentence is disproportionate
to the crime of rape of an adult and, therefore, constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment, violating the Eighth Amendment of the United States
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requirements that death penalty statutes narrow the number of
people eligible for a sentence of death,7 and provide for an
individualized sentencing scheme.8 An individualized sentencing
scheme requires jurors, prior to sentencing a defendant to death,
to consider both “aggravating” circumstances—factors making
the crime worse9—and “mitigating” circumstances—factors
Constitution). But see State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1072 (La. 1996)
(holding that “in the case of the rape of a child under the age of twelve, the
death penalty is not an excessive punishment”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1259
(1996); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Nor shall cruel and unusual
punishment be inflicted”). The Supreme Court has held the death penalty
unconstitutional for crimes other than murder. Compare Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that imposing a death sentence violated the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when the defendant merely
drove the getaway car during a robbery and did not know of the violence that
occurred in connection with the crime), with Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137
(1987) (permitting a death sentence to be imposed against someone who did
not physically commit murder but either had the mens rea necessary to commit
murder or acted with a reckless indifference toward human life).
7
See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (requiring that the
circumstances permitting a sentencing body to impose a death sentence apply
only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder rather than to every
defendant convicted of murder). Under Tuilaepa, the Supreme Court required
limitations on the “eligibility phase,” which determines who can receive the
death penalty, but refused to require limitations on the “selection phase,”
which determines whether an individual defendant receives the death penalty.
Id. at 973. See also Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (holding
that “the use of aggravating circumstances is not an end in itself, but a means
of genuinely narrowing the class of death eligible persons and thereby
channeling the jury’s discretion”); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877
(1983) (holding that to pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme
must “generally narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty”);
James R. Acker & C. S. Lanier, Capital Murder from Benefit of Clergy to
Bifurcated Trials: Narrowing the Class of Offenses Punishable by Death, 29
CRIM. L. BULL. 291, 297 (1993) (noting the “eligibility phase” and the
“selection phase” as the two principle limitations on capital punishment
legislation).
8
See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Individualized sentencing
involves “consideration of the character and record of the individual offender
and the circumstances of the particular offense . . . .” Id. at 604 (quoting
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
9
While the Supreme Court does not specifically define what constitutes
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making either the crime or the defendant appear less heinous.10
an aggravating factor, the Court requires disclosure to the defense of what
aggravating factors will be presented to the jury prior to the commencement of
trial. Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125 (1991) (reversing a death sentence
because the defendant was not given sufficient notice that he might be
subjected to capital punishment); see Louis D. Bilionis, Moral
Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283 (1991) (providing a comprehensive analysis of
individualized sentencing and the effect of Lockett upon the concept of
aggravation and mitigation within the context of the death penalty). While
aggravating factors have not been given a legal definition by either the courts
or statutes, the term has been defined as “any circumstance attending the
commission of a crime . . . which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to its
injurious consequences.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 65 (6th ed. 1990); see
Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand
Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1, 12-14 (1995) (defining aggravating
factors in common usage as anything that tends to annoy or bother another
person and discussing the likelihood that jurors use the “common” definition
during deliberations); see also, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (1998).
There is no exclusive list of what constitutes an aggravating circumstance, but
the most common aggravating factors include the following: whether the
victim was a police officer, was being held for ransom, was killed because he
or she was to testify in a criminal trial or was tortured to death; or whether the
defendant hired the killer, killed while committing a felony, subjected a third
person to a grave risk of death, had a history of felony convictions or had been
previously convicted of another murder. Id.
10
See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 188 (1988) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (referring to mitigating evidence as “facts about the defendant’s
character or background or circumstances of the particular offense that may
call for a penalty less than death”). While there is no agreed upon legal
definition of mitigating circumstances, the Supreme Court has construed the
concept of mitigation more liberally than aggravation and allows almost
anything to be presented to the jury as mitigation. See Bilionis, supra note 9.
While mitigating circumstances have not been given a legal definition by either
courts or statutes, the term has been defined as those circumstances that “do
not constitute a justification or excuse for the offense in question, but which,
in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the
degree of moral culpability.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1002 (6th ed. 1990).
See also infra Part II (discussing mitigation in the context of the Lockett
Doctrine). See infra Part III (analyzing jurors’ failure to understand the
distinction between a common usage of the term mitigation and the use of the
concept of mitigation in the legal forum). Some of the most common
mitigating factors include lesser involvement in the crime, physical abuse as a
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Nevertheless, in order for an individualized sentencing
scheme to ensure that only the worst criminals are given the
death penalty, the jury must know how to “give effect” to
relevant mitigating evidence presented to them at sentencing.11
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to
mean that a jury cannot be prevented from giving effect to
mitigating evidence.12 Despite the Supreme Court’s unwavering
dedication to the belief that a death sentence should be
determined based upon consideration of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances,13 cases such as Blystone v.
Pennsylvania,14 as well as empirical studies,15 demonstrate that
child and mental retardation, as well as defendant’s age, poverty and a lack of
a criminal record.
11
See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 789-90 (2001) (referring to
“giving effect” to mitigating evidence in terms of deciding how much weight
the mitigating factors deserve and considering mitigating evidence in assessing
the defendant’s personal culpability for the crime for which the defendant was
convicted).
12
See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) (holding that a
death penalty statute cannot require juries to unanimously find the existence of
mitigating evidence prior to considering whether the mitigating evidence is
strong enough to spare the defendant’s life); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367
(1988) (holding that a death penalty statute cannot require juries to
unanimously find the existence of mitigating evidence prior to considering
whether the mitigating evidence is strong enough to spare the defendant’s life);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (reversing the death sentence of a
defendant who merely drove the getaway car during a robbery and murder
because the applicable statute did not permit the jury to consider the
defendant’s lesser involvement in the crime).
13
See, e.g., Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998) (refusing to
require jury instructions on particular mitigating factors, but reaffirming that a
death sentence should be based upon a consideration of both aggravating and
mitigating circumstances).
14
494 U.S. 299 (1990) (upholding a death sentence despite both the
jury’s expressed confusion about the definition of mitigation and desire not to
impose a death sentence). See also infra Part III (discussing confused jurors in
capital cases).
15
See, e.g., Bethany K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury
Instructions, and Comprehension Issues, 67 TENN. L. REV. 701 (2000)
(discussing juries’ lack of comprehension and suggesting ways to correct the
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defendants may lose their life not for the crime they committed,
but because the jury failed to comprehend the law and did not
receive the guidance necessary to adequately evaluate mitigating
factors. As a result, cases exist where the jury believed the
defendant did not deserve the death penalty, but, nonetheless,
imposed the death penalty mistakenly believing they either had
found no mitigation or that the particular mitigating evidence was
not legally sufficient to spare the defendant’s life.16
In Blystone, the Pennsylvania death penalty statute, which
requires a jury to impose a death sentence upon the finding of no

problem). The author points out that “[s]yntactic and semantic bars to juror
comprehension . . . can be made more comprehensible by simplifying
sentence structure and by giving additional information about the meanings of
abstract terms.” Id. at 701; see also Craig Haney, Taking Capital Jury
Seriously, 70 IND. L.J. 1223 (1995) (discussing the reasons why juries impose
the death sentence).
Th[e] decision-making process is . .
. governed by confusion, lack of understanding and even chaos.
Jurors decide life-and-death questions laboring under numerous
misconceptions about the utility and operations of capital
punishment—sometimes unclear about the fundamental importance of
certain kinds of evidence (including something as basic as whether the
evidence is aggravating or mitigating).
Id. at 1224-25; Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs—Capital Jurors Who Change
Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines,
70 IND. L.J. 1183 (1995) (discussing the reasons why juries impose the death
sentence).
16
Blystone, 494 U.S. at 312 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the
jury’s repeated requests for clarification); see also Prelim. Pet. for Writ of
Habeas Corpus for Pet’r Blystone, Blystone v. Horn, No. 99-490 (W.D. Pa.
filed Mar. 28, 2000). The jury asked the judge if they had to impose the death
sentence if they found no mitigating factors. Id. at 68-69. Arguably, the jury’s
repeated questions demonstrate not only a misunderstanding of the law but
also a feeling that the aggravating circumstance was not severe enough to
impose a death sentence. See Stephen P. Garvey et al., Correcting Deadly
Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital Cases, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 627 (2000) (discussing the jury’s ability to understand the law as stated
in actual capital cases as compared with revised mock jury instructions and
explaining the implications of the results).
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mitigating factors but at least one aggravating factor,17 passed
constitutional muster because the statute allowed the jury to take
into account any and all factors about the defendant or the crime
when considering mitigation.18
Recent developments reaffirmed the notion that in addition to
permitting juries to consider mitigating evidence, juries must
have both the opportunity and the means within the law to
consider and give effect to relevant mitigating evidence.19 In
Penry II, the Supreme Court held that the mere existence of a
statute or a jury instruction allowing the jury to consider all
mitigating evidence is not necessarily enough to permit the jury
to give effect to the relevant mitigating evidence.20 Despite this
notion, nothing has been done to correct the continuing problem
of juries sentencing defendants to death under the mistaken belief
they have not found the necessary mitigation to spare the
defendant’s life.21
This note focuses on the effect Penry II has upon Blystone
and subsequent cases, and discusses situations in which the jury
either was confused about mitigation or expressed a desire to
sentence the defendant to life in prison, but nonetheless imposed
a death sentence. This note does not argue that the U.S.
Constitution requires courts to give all capital juries specific
instructions on the law of mitigation or how to determine when
17

42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (1998) (requiring that “the verdict
must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one
aggravating circumstance . . . and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury
unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any
mitigating circumstances.”). Mitigating circumstances “include[] any other
evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant
and the circumstances of his offense.” Id. at (e)(8).
18
Blystone, 494 U.S. at 304; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT §
9711(c)(1)(iv) (1998).
19
See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (reversing defendant’s
death sentence because the judge’s instructions did not permit the jury to
consider and give effect to evidence of the defendant’s mental retardation).
20
Id. at 793-96.
21
Research has found no statutes that have been amended or adopted to
address what should be done when a jury appears confused on whether they
found any mitigation.
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mitigation exists.22 Rather, this note argues that, in light of Penry
II, the U.S Constitution requires that a jury receive instructions
and guidance on what constitutes mitigating evidence and how to
proceed once they have found mitigating evidence when the jury
expresses confusion about mitigation or a desire not to sentence
the defendant to death.23
Part I of this note provides a comprehensive overview of
death penalty jurisprudence in the United States, from Furman v.
Georgia24 to the present, and includes a discussion of guided
discretion,25 individualized sentencing and mitigation. Part II
22

See Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1988) (holding juries do not
have to be instructed on the concept of mitigating evidence or a particular
statutory mitigating factor). But see STATE OF ILLINOIS, REPORT OF THE
GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 141 (2002) [hereinafter,
REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION] (suggesting revisions to the
Illinois pattern jury instructions, to include providing detailed explanations of
the concept of mitigation), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/
reports/commission_report/index.html. The high number of misconceptions by
capital jurors demonstrates that instructing juries on the concept of mitigating
evidence might be the better practice. See infra Part III (discussing both
empirical studies pertaining to jury comprehension in capital trials and cases
where the jury asked the judge for assistance in understanding the complicated
terminology applicable in capital cases).
23
Cf. Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 272 (dealing with jury instructions when
there is no evidence that the jury was either confused or desired to spare the
defendant). The Supreme Court has never directly ruled on a judge’s duty to
ensure that constitutional mandates for capital sentencing are upheld when the
jury expresses either a desire to spare the defendant’s life or confusion
pertaining to mitigation. See Berlow, Deadly Decisions, supra note 1
(referring to comments made by Paula Hannaford of the National Association
of State Courts). Arguably, juries misunderstanding instructions lead to
arbitrary death sentences, violating Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
24
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (invalidating the death penalty in
thirty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government by
holding the death penalty as applied within the United States was
unconstitutional because it allowed the sentencing body to arbitrarily impose a
death sentence).
25
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (describing guided
discretion as directing and limiting the sentencing bodies’ authority to impose
a death sentence in order to minimize the risk of arbitrary and capricious
sentences); see also Lief H. Carter, Capital Punishment, in THE OXFORD
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discusses the Blystone and Penry II decisions. Part III
demonstrates, through the analysis of empirical studies, that
juries often do not understand how to give effect to mitigation.
Part IV analyzes the effect of Penry II upon the future of capital
punishment jurisprudence. Part V provides a brief summary on
what the law now requires regarding jury instructions pertaining
to mitigating evidence and what can be expected in the future.
This note concludes that juries must be given specific guidance
when the jury repeatedly expresses confusion on either the
meaning of mitigation, how to determine whether mitigation
exists, or what to do when mitigation has been found.
I.

OVERVIEW OF DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE26

Currently, thirty-eight states and the federal government
sanction the death penalty as punishment for certain types of
murder.27 A moratorium on executions exists in two of these
states,28 and two judges have held the federal death penalty
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 126 (Kermit L.
Hall ed., 1992). Guided discretion can be defined as “statutory sentencing
standards to guide sentencing bodies in making capital punishment decisions.”
Id.
26
See Hugo Adam Bedau, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES (Oxford Univ. Press, 1997) (providing a comprehensive
analysis of the death penalty in the United States); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan
M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulations of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355
(1995) (analyzing Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence since Furman).
27
For a complete, current list of state death penalty statutes, see Death
Penalty Information Center, State by State Death Penalty Information, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/firstpage.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
The states that sanction the death penalty are as follows: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
28
See REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION, supra note 22. After
discovering that more innocent people had been released from death row than
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unconstitutional.29 The other twelve states and the District of
Columbia do not permit the death penalty.30 Currently, guidelines
must be followed prior to imposing a death sentence.31 For
example, a death penalty statute must narrow the class of people
eligible for the death penalty,32 and a jury must be able to give
effect to relevant mitigating evidence.33 These guidelines, which
are relatively new developments resulting from an evolving
interpretation during the past quarter century of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,

had been executed over the past twenty-four years, Illinois Governor George
C. Ryan imposed a moratorium on executions beginning in 2000. Id. See also
Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence: Freed from Death Row, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innoc.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002). The
problem in Illinois also plagues the entire country, as evidenced by the 102
wrongly convicted individuals released from death row since 1973. Id. See
also Press Release, State of Maryland Governor’s Press Office, Governor
Glendening Issues a Stay of Execution in the Case of Wesley Eugene Baker
(May 9, 2002) (staying one execution and stating an intent to stay all
executions pending the release of a report detailing death penalty research
conducted by the University of Maryland), at http://www.gov.state.md.us/
gov/press/2002/may/html/baker.html.
29
See United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 257 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). In light of developing forms of technology, Judge Rakoff held the
federal death penalty violates the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution because the finality of the death penalty deprives death row
inmates of the procedural opportunities to prove their innocence as mandated
by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. See also United States v.
Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469 (D. Vt. 2002) (finding the Federal Death Penalty
Act unconstitutional).
30
See Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Death Penalty
Information, supra note 27. The states that do not permit the death penalty are
as follows: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Id.
31
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that
Georgia’s “threshold” death penalty statute dispels with the Furman concerns
about arbitrarily and capriciously imposed death sentences).
32
See supra note 7 (citing Supreme Court cases and secondary authority
discussing class narrowing and individualized sentencing).
33
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
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are constantly expanding.34
A. The Road to a New Error in Capital Punishment
Jurisprudence
Prior to 1972, the Supreme Court rarely discussed the death
penalty in terms of cruel and unusual punishment.35 In 1972, in
Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court’s changing view on both
the gravity of the death penalty and the analysis that would be
applied in future capital cases became evident.36 For the first
time, the Supreme Court applied the Eighth Amendment to
invalidate capital sentencing statutes for violating the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.37 The Supreme Court was
sharply divided on the reason for invalidating the statutes. This
resulted in each justice writing an opinion, making Furman one

34

See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 586 (1978) (establishing the evolving
standards of decency method for determining cruel and unusual punishment
and reversing a death sentence when the state law prevented the sentencing
body from considering evidence of the defendant’s lesser involvement in the
murder); see also infra Part IV (analyzing the meaning of “giving effect to
relevant mitigating evidence”).
35
See Louisiana ex rel. Francis Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947)
(approving repeated electrocutions when the first attempt failed); Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (approving public firing squads); Bedau, supra
notes 4, 5 (discussing the history and evolution of the death penalty within the
United States).
36
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). In Furman, the issue was the
constitutionality of state death penalty statutes that permitted the jury to
impose a sentence of anything from a brief term of years to death when the
defendant had been convicted of either murder or rape. Id.
37
Id. at 239-40. “If the death penalty is limited by the fourteenth
amendment’s equal protection clause as are other laws in this country then
selectivity based on unpopular defendants is unconstitutional” because
imposing the death penalty on a particular class of people violates the desire
for equality that was implicit within the ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Jason M. Schoenberg, Making the Constitutional Cut: Evaluating New York’s
Death Penalty Statute in Light of the Supreme Court’s Capital Punishment
Mandates, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 337, 345 n.43 (1999); see U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII (“nor [shall] cruel and unusual punishment [be] inflicted”).
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of the longest Supreme Court opinions ever written.38 Moreover,
the Court only addressed the statutes as applied rather than the
constitutionality of capital punishment on its face.39 Despite the
differing opinions, Furman invalidated all death penalty statutes
throughout the country.40
B. The Beginning of Modern Death Penalty Jurisprudence
Within four years of Furman, many states rewrote their death
penalty statutes.41 Accordingly, cases began to appear before the
Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of three different
types of statutes.42 The first type of statute, commonly referred to
as a “weighing” type of “guided discretion,”43 requires the

38

Nina Rivkind & Steven F. Shatz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
DEATH PENALTY 44 n.a (2001) (stating that Furman took up 233 pages in the
official reporter).
39
See generally Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Justices Douglas, Stewart,
and White each wrote concurring opinions in Furman in which they expressed
their displeasure with the manner in which the death penalty was applied. Id.
“Juries have practically untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist
that he die.” Id. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring). “These death sentences are
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual . . . .” Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). “[T]here is no meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which death is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not.” Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
40
See Bedau, supra note 5 (discussing the ramifications of Furman);
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 26, at 371 (discussing the complexities of the
Supreme Court’s death penalty doctrine since 1976). As a result of Furman all
death sentences were commuted to sentences of life imprisonment. Id.
41
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 n.23 (1976) (addressing the
constitutionality of the death penalty statute enacted in Georgia in the wake of
Furman).
42
See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding
mandatory death penalty statutes unconstitutional); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding a “weighing” statute); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding a “threshold” statute); see also infra Part II
(discussing the specific questions under the Texas death penalty statute).
43
See Carter, supra note 25 (defining “guided discretion”). Twenty-three
states have a “weighing” death penalty statute. See ALA. CODE § 13-A-5-39 to
-59 (Michie 1994); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-48 (Michie 1994) (outlining weighing
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sentencing body to find the existence of at least one statutory
provision); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-601 to -617 (Michie Supp. 1987); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-603(2), 5-4-604 (Michie Supp. 1987) (outlining weighing
provision); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1-.9 (West 1998, Supp. 2002); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1998) (outlining weighing provision); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 16-11-103, -401, -401.5, -402 to -405, 16-12-201 to -210
(West supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(2)(a)(III) (West Supp.
1991) (outlining weighing provision); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a to -46b
(West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-46a (West 2001) (outlining weighing
provision); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209 (Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §4209(d)(1)(b) (Supp. 1991) (outlining weighing provision); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(b), (3)(b)
(West 2001) (outlining weighing provision); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie
1987); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(C) (Michie 1987) (outlining weighing
provision); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-6-1, 35-50-2-9 (West Supp. 1991);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b) (West Supp. 1991) (outlining weighing
provision); KAN STAT. ANN. § 21-3439 (1994), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624
(Michie 1994) (outlining weighing provision); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413
(Michie 1996) (including weighing provision); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101
to -103 (West supp. 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-103 (West supp. 1991)
(outlining weighing provision); MO. ANN. STAT. 565-030 to -040 (Vernon
Supp. 1992); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (outlining
weighing provision); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521 to -2534 (1989); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2522 (1989) (outlining weighing provision); NEV. REV. STAT. §
200.030-.035 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(4)(a) (1991) (outlining
weighing provision); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.5 (Supp. 1991); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(IV) (Supp. 1991) (outlining weighing provision);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West
1995) (outlining weighing provision); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney
1998 & Supp. 1999); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp.
1999) (outlining weighing provision); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (Lexis
2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b)(2) (Lexis 2000) (outlining weighing
provision); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03-.05 (West 1989); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (West 1989) (outlining weighing provision);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 701.10-.15 (West 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21 § 701.11 (West Supp. 1992) (outlining weighing provision); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9711 (1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(C)(1)(IV) (1998) (outlining
weighing provision); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (Lexis 1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(g)(1)(B) (Lexis 1991) (outlining weighing provision).
The statutory schemes of Oregon and Texas do not fit within the categories of
weighing or non-weighing statutes but have been held constitutional by the
United States Supreme Court. See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1997); TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.01-.071 (Vernon 1992).
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aggravating circumstance.44 Then, assuming the jury finds a
statutory aggravator, the sentencing body must weigh the
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances to
determine whether the former outweighed the latter.45 The second
type of statute is also a form of guided discretion but is
considered to be a “threshold statute.”46
44

See supra note 9 (discussing the meaning of aggravating
circumstances); see also infra note 47 (citing Georgia’s threshold death penalty
statute and discussing the meaning of “statutory aggravating circumstance”).
45
See supra note 10 (discussing the meaning of mitigating
circumstances); see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding
the constitutionality of a “weighing” statute).
46
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (Michie 1997) (requiring a
threshold showing of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance prior to
permitting the jury to consider imposing the death sentence, but allowing the
jury to impose a life sentence regardless of the consideration of mitigating
circumstances). Thirteen states have a non-weighing, “threshold” death
penalty statute. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2002); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (West 2002) (outlining non-weighing
provision); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (Michie 1997, supp. 2002); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (Michie 1997) (outlining non-weighing provision); 720
ILL. ANN. STAT. 5/9-1 (Michie 1993, Supp. 2002); 720 ILL. ANN. STAT. 5/91(g)(h) (Michie 1993, supp. 2002) (outlining non-weighing provision); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1999, supp. 2001); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1999, supp. 2001)
(outlining non-weighing provision); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905
(West 1984); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West Supp. 1992)
(outlining non-weighing provision); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (2001) (outlining non-weighing provision);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14 (Michie 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1814(A) (Michie 1990) (outlining non-weighing provision); S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-3-20 (Law Co-op Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Coop Supp. 1991) (outlining non-weighing provision); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 23A-27A-1 (Michie 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-6
(Michie 1998) (outlining non-weighing provision); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3206 to -207 (Lexis Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(4) (Lexis supp.
1992) (outlining non-weighing provision); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 to 264.4 (Michie 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 to -264.4 (C) (Michie
1990) (outlining non-weighing provision); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
10.95.020 -.190 (West 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060(4) (West
1990) (outlining non-weighing provision); WYO. STAT. § 6-2-102 (Michie
1988); WYO. STAT. § 6-2-102(e) (Michie 1988) (outlining non-weighing
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As in the “weighing” statute, the sentencing body is required
to find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance,47 and it must consider aggravating and mitigating
factors prior to imposing a death sentence.48 Yet, instead of
weighing the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors, a
“threshold” statute permits the jury to spare the defendant’s life
for any or no reason at all.49 The third type of death penalty
statute made the death penalty mandatory for certain types of
crimes, such as murder in the first degree.50
In reaching a decision on the constitutionality of these statutes
for the first time, the Supreme Court, in a one paragraph per
curium opinion, held that “the punishment of death does not
invariably violate the Constitution.”51 In reviewing the
“threshold” statute and the “weighing” statute, the Supreme
Court concluded that the concern in Furman, exemplified by
Justice Stewart’s statement that the death penalty was “wantonly

provision).
47
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (Michie 1997) (enumerating the
statutory aggravating circumstances in Georgia). A statutory aggravating
circumstance is an aggravating circumstance that is specifically enumerated
within the death penalty statute. Id. Non-statutory aggravating circumstances
are aggravating circumstances not specifically enumerated within the state’s
death penalty statute. Id.
48
See GA.CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (Michie 1997).
49
Id.; see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (per curiam)
(upholding the constitutionality of a “threshold” statute).
50
See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 638 (1977) (striking down a
mandatory death sentence for the murder of a police officer); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (invalidating a death penalty statute requiring
the death sentence for a first degree murder conviction); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating mandatory death sentences for
first degree murder); see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987)
(holding a mandatory death sentence for an inmate convicted of murder while
serving a life sentence unconstitutional).
51
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168-69 (explaining that the reasoning behind the
decision in Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), was based upon the manner in
which the death penalty was implemented and who was sentenced to death
rather than a per se rule that the death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment).
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and freakishly imposed,”52 would be resolved as long as the
sentencing body was given “adequate information and
guidance.”53 In analyzing how this could be accomplished, the
Supreme Court suggested a bifurcated proceeding,54 which would
allow the sentencing body to first determine guilt and then,
assuming the defendant was found guilty, determine the sentence
in a separate proceeding.55
The Supreme Court reached a different conclusion on the
constitutionality of mandatory death sentences in Woodson v.
North Carolina56 and Roberts v. Louisiana.57 In invalidating this
type of sentencing scheme, the Supreme Court realized the “need
for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate

52

Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
54
Id. The twin objectives of consistency and individuality are “best met
by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing
authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence
and provided with standards to guide its use of the information.” Id. See also
Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Death Penalty Information,
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2002). The
bifurcated system is now utilized in all states that permit the imposition of the
death penalty. Id.
55
Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Death Penalty
Information, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/firstpage.html (last visited
Nov. 15, 2002). Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana and Nebraska required
the judge to determine the sentence, but this was recently held to be a violation
of the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury. See Ring v.
Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana
permit the judge to override the jury’s recommendation of life. See Death
Penalty Information Center, Developments Related to Ring, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Ring. html#cases (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
It is currently unclear as to whether these override provisions are affected by
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring. Nonetheless, the Florida
Supreme Court has stayed two executions, in light of Ring, to allow the court
to hear arguments on the Florida override system. Phil Long, Florida Supreme
Court Halts Two Executions, MIAMI HERALD, July 9, 2002, at A1.
56
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating a statute requiring the death penalty
for first degree murder).
57
428 U.S. 325 (1976) (invalidating a statute requiring the death penalty
for first degree murder).
53
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punishment.”58 The Supreme Court held that a “mandatory death
penalty statute does not meet the constitutional requirement of
replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective
standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable
the process for imposing death.”59
Furthermore, in Woodson, the Supreme Court took the
reliability element of sentencing to a higher level when it
discussed the concept of individualized sentencing.60 The
Supreme Court reasoned that “mandatory death penalty statutes
unconstitutionally fail to allow the particularized consideration of
relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted
defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of
death.”61 Thus, a mandatory death penalty statute for certain
types of murder prevents the consideration of “compassionate or
mitigating factors serving from the diverse frailties of
humankind”62 and results in a “faceless, undifferentiated mass
[being] subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.”63
Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that mandatory death
sentences would be inconsistent with the “fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment.”64
C. Every Human Being is Unique: The Requirement of
Individualized Sentencing65
Individualized sentencing means that the sentencing
proceeding should be based on a consideration of “relevant facets
of the character and record of the individual offender” and “the

58

Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
Id. at 303.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.; see infra note 6 (discussing the death penalty for crimes other than
murder).
63
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
64
Id.
65
See Bilionis, supra note 9 (discussing individualized sentencing and the
Lockett Doctrine).
59
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circumstances of the particular offense.”66 Accordingly, if
properly implemented, individualized sentencing would alleviate
the problem of arbitrary death sentences.67
This concept of individualized sentencing, first discussed as
dicta in Woodson,68 did not have a major impact upon death
penalty jurisprudence until Lockett v. Ohio.69 In Lockett, the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a statute that did not
permit the decision maker to consider as a mitigating factor the
defendant’s lesser involvement in the crime.70 In doing so, the
Supreme Court reiterated the need for a “greater degree of
reliability when a death sentence is imposed”71 and handed down
specific guidelines to ensure a death sentence is not applied in an
“arbitrary and capricious manner.”72 These new guidelines
require that the “sentencing body be able to [consider] as a
mitigating factor, any [relevant] aspect of [a] defendant’s
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death”73 in order to ensure that the death penalty is not “imposed

66

Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (discussing the concept of individualized
sentencing); accord Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (discussing the
concept of individualized sentencing); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (discussing the concept of individualized sentencing).
67
See generally Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (discussing the importance
of individualized sentencing in ensuring that the death penalty is not arbitrarily
imposed).
68
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding mandatory death sentences
unconstitutional while also discussing individualized sentencing).
69
438 U.S. 586 (1978).
70
Id. In Lockett, the defendant merely drove the getaway car and may not
have been present at the time the robbery occurred. Id.
71
Id. at 604; accord Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding
the death penalty, as applied in the United States, unconstitutional since the
death sentences were unreliable due to there being no way to distinguish those
who were sentenced to death from those whose lives were spared).
72
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 601; see generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972).
73
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; accord McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S.
433 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
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in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.”74
As a corollary to this requirement, the sentencing body must
be given the means to consider mitigating evidence.75 This
ensures that the sentencing body’s “ability to consider . . .
relevant mitigating evidence” is more than merely a goal that
cannot be achieved.76 Thus, the sentencing body’s decision
should focus on the individual defendant rather than the crime or
the impact of the crime.77
The individualized sentencing requirement adopted and
expanded upon in Lockett has resulted in a large number of cases
interpreting the extent of the Lockett Doctrine.78 In Penry v.
Lynaugh,79 as a natural result of Lockett, the Supreme Court held
74

Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605; accord California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538
(1987) (reversing a death sentence where the jury failed to address relevant
mitigating factors in determining the sentence).
[E]vidence about the defendant’s background and character is relevant
[as mitigation] because of the belief, long held by this society, that
defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a
disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems,
may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.
Id. at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
75
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (reversing a death
sentence because the jury was not given the means to give mitigating weight to
the defendant’s mental retardation).
76
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
77
See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (holding that
victim-impact evidence is admissible at the sentencing proceeding of a death
penalty case not because of the impact of the crime, but to enable the jury to
get a clear picture of what happened so that the sentencing decision will be
more focused on the individual defendant).
78
See infra notes 79-95 (discussing cases applying and expanding the
Lockett Doctrine).
79
492 U.S. 302 (1989) (reversing a death sentence because the jury
instructions did not permit the jury to consider the defendant’s mental
retardation as grounds to spare his life). Penry was retried by the state of
Texas and convicted under the same statute, which was amended to include a
supplemental instruction pertaining to mental retardation. Penry v. Johnson,
532 U.S. 782, 786 (2001). Again, Penry’s death sentence was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court. Id. at 804. See Harvey Rice, Penry Sentenced
3rd Time to Die: Jury Rejects Argument for Retardation, HOUS. CHRON., July
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that “[t]he sentencer must . . . be able to . . . give effect to [any
mitigating evidence relevant to the defendant’s background or to
the circumstances of the crime] in imposing [the] sentence.”80
Therefore, the sentencing body must be “provided with a vehicle
for expressing its reasoned moral response to mitigating evidence
in rendering its sentencing decision.”81
As a result of Lockett and its progeny, the sentencing body
cannot refuse to consider relevant mitigating evidence or refuse
to give relevant mitigating evidence any weight.82 Similarly, the
judge cannot prevent the defendant from placing relevant
mitigating evidence before the jury.83 Finally, the Supreme Court
has held that the sentencing body must also be allowed to
consider non-statutory mitigating factors.84
These expansive readings of Lockett have led to the
presentation to a jury of myriad factors in an attempt to spare the
defendant’s life.85 As a result, many courts have held that, under
Lockett, the defendant cannot be prevented from presenting
mitigating evidence bearing upon the defendant’s age,86 mental

4, 2002, at 1; Nightline (ABC television broadcast, July 11, 2002). The State
of Texas sought the death penalty against Penry for a third time, and on July
3, 2002, the jury imposed a third death sentence on Penry after finding he was
not mentally retarded. Id. See infra Part II (discussing the facts and law
pertaining to the two Penry cases).
80
Penry I, 492 U.S. at 319.
81
Id. at 328.
82
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (reversing a death
sentence where the sentencing body refused to consider mitigating evidence
pertaining to the defendant’s unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance).
83
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (reversing a death
sentence when the judge refused to allow the defendant to offer evidence of his
good behavior while in prison).
84
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (holding that the
requirement that the “sentencer not refuse to consider or be precluded from
considering any relevant mitigating evidence” applies to non-statutory
mitigating evidence, quoting Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4).
85
See Bilionis, supra note 9 (discussing the impact of the Lockett
Doctrine).
86
See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 375 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(reversing a death sentence because the trial court prevented the defendant
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retardation,87 provocation by others,88 insanity,89 alcohol or drug
usage,90 limited involvement in the actual homicide,91 neglect,92
child abuse,93 poverty94 and a minor criminal record.95
D. Recent Developments Pertaining to the Individualized
Sentencing Scheme and Jury Instructions
During the past decade, the Supreme Court started retreating
from the principles of Lockett and handing down rulings that are
from presenting age as a mitigating factor while holding that executing a
defendant who was under the age of sixteen at the time of the commission of
the crime constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. But see Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executing the mentally retarded violates the
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and,
therefore, overruling in part Penry I, which permitted the execution of the
mentally retarded). In light of Atkins, a debate currently exists as to whether
executing a juvenile remains constitutional. See Patterson v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
24 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.).
87
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), overruled in part by, Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that that executing the mentally
retarded violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment); see also Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002) (holding that
juries must make findings of facts that could increase the sentence). In light of
Ring, it appears as if the jury must both determine whether the defendant is
mentally retarded, making him ineligible for the death penalty, and, in the
alternative, whether a lower intellectual status not rising to the level of mental
retardation constitutes sufficient mitigation to spare the defendant’s life.
88
Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 621 (5th Cir. 1978).
89
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 414 (1986).
90
Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1511 (10th Cir. 1987).
91
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). But see Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137 (1987) (permitting the death penalty for a defendant who did not
commit murder, but either had the mens rea necessary to commit the murder
or acted with a reckless indifference towards the crime).
92
Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1433 (11th Cir. 1987).
93
Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987).
94
See generally Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir.
1986).
95
Coleman v. Risley, 839 F.2d 434, 453 (9th Cir. 1988).
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less favorable to defendants.96 For example, the Supreme Court
does not require the trial judge to instruct the jury with either an
explanation of the terminology contained within the instructions
or how to apply the principles of mitigation.97 This poses a
problem for a confused jury because, absent an explanation, a
jury that is unable to understand the instructions or does not
know when it has found relevant mitigating evidence is incapable
of adequately considering the mitigating evidence.
In Buchanan v. Angelone,98 the Supreme Court failed to
directly address the issue of what to do with juries that are
confused about mitigation when the Court held that a capital jury
does not generally have to be instructed on the concept of
mitigating evidence or on a particular statutory mitigating
factor.99 In Weeks v. Angelone,100 decided prior to Penry II, the
Supreme Court again dodged the issue of juries expressing a
misunderstanding mitigation. Instead, the court only addressed
the issue of what the judge should do when the jury asks if they
are required to impose the death penalty upon finding that an
aggravating factor has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.101

96

See, e.g., Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998) (holding that a
judge does not need to give specific instructions pertaining to the law of
mitigation when there is no reason to believe that the instruction is necessary).
97
See id. at 272.
98
522 U.S. 269 (1998).
99
Id. at 272.
100
528 U.S. 225 (2000).
101
Id. at 234. The existence of an aggravating factor is never sufficient in
itself to sentence a person to death. Cf. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967,
972 (1994) (ruling that aggravating factors are those that only apply to a
subclass of defendants and thus narrow the class of people eligible for the
death sentence); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (holding that
“the use of aggravating circumstances is not an end in itself, but a means of
genuinely narrowing the class of death eligible persons and thereby channeling
the jury’s discretion”). Nevertheless, many jurors believe the existence of an
aggravating circumstance requires the defendant to be sentenced to death. See
William S. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview
of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1091 (1995) (finding that many jurors
“believed that they were required to impose the death penalty if they found
that the crime was heinous, vile or depraved”); Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
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Despite the jury’s obvious misunderstanding of the law,102 the
Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not err by merely
referring the jury back to the relevant portion of his original jury
instructions since the jury “would have asked another [question]
if it felt the judge’s response unsatisfactory.”103 Thus, the
Supreme Court assumed that the jury was no longer confused
because, unlike in Blystone, the jury did not ask any further
questions. While Supreme Court jurisprudence pertaining to jury
instructions in capital cases has not been favorable to defendants,
the Supreme Court has determined that jury instructions violate
the principles of individualized sentencing established in Lockett
when “there [is a] reasonable likelihood that the jury . . . applied
the instruction in a way that prevented consideration of
constitutionally relevant [mitigating] evidence.”104
II. CASE LAW PERTAINING TO GIVING EFFECT TO RELEVANT
MITIGATING EVIDENCE
During the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has begun
addressing what it means to consider evidence in the sentencing

Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: An Empirical Study, 44 BUFF. L.
REV. 339, 360 (1996) (stating that “[n]early one-third of jurors were under the
mistaken impression that the law required a death sentence if they found
heinousness or dangerousness”); William S. Geiner & Jonathan Amsterdam,
Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death
Penalty Trials, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 41 (1989) (finding a significant number
of jurors in death penalty cases believed that the death penalty was mandatory
or presumed for first degree murder).
102
See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972 (holding that aggravating factors are
necessary to impose the death penalty and, therefore, perform the required
narrowing function, but are not enough, alone, to impose a death sentence).
Therefore, the finding of an aggravating circumstance is not enough, in itself,
to justify a death sentence. Cf. id.; see also, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
877 (1983) (holding that to pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing
scheme must “genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty”).
103
Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234, 236.
104
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990).
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phase of a capital murder trial.105 The Supreme Court eventually
reached the conclusion that the word “consider” means the jury
must not only weigh the mitigating evidence in their decision, but
also must have a “vehicle” for giving effect to this mitigating
evidence.106 Defining exactly what is meant by a “vehicle” for
giving effect to mitigation became the subject of two landmark
decisions pertaining to modern death penalty jurisprudence.107
A. Blystone v. Pennsylvania
In Blystone v. Pennsylvania,108 Scott Blystone and his friends
picked up a hitchhiker and robbed him.109 Upon request, the
hitchhiker failed to hand over any money.110 Blystone pulled over
to the side of the road and took thirteen dollars from the
hitchhiker at gunpoint. 111 After taking the money, Blystone then
ordered the hitchhiker to lay face down and shot him six times in

105

See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); see also supra note 74 (quoting Justice O’Connor’s concurrence).
106
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329 (1989) (referring to “vehicle”
as a way for the jury to obey the law and still determine that the defendant
should receive a life sentence based on the mitigating evidence presented at
trial).
107
See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (holding that a
constitutional statute is not enough in itself to ensure that a sentencing body
has an avenue to give effect to relevant mitigating evidence); Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) (holding that a statute mandating
death if no mitigating circumstances exist gives the jury an avenue to consider
relevant mitigating evidence because the jury must consider the potential
mitigating evidence in order to determine whether mitigating evidence exists).
108
494 U.S. 299 (1990).
109
Id. at 301.
110
See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Writ of Habeas Corpus for Pet’r
Blystone at 64, Blystone v. Horn, No. 99-490 (W.D. Pa. filed Mar. 28,
2000).
111
See id. There is currently a dispute over whether Blystone actually
obtained any money from the hitchhiker and, therefore, whether the
aggravating circumstance of committing the murder in the commission of a
robbery actually existed. Id. Moreover, the jury never considered whether the
taking of only thirteen dollars constituted a mitigating circumstance. Id.
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the head, causing his death.112
Blystone was charged with capital murder and represented at
trial by a public defender.113 At the sentencing phase of trial,
Blystone failed to present any mitigating evidence.114
Nonetheless, under Pennsylvania law, the failure to present
mitigating evidence does not preclude the jury from finding
mitigating evidence.115 In Pennsylvania, the entire guilt phase of
the trial is incorporated as evidence into the sentencing phase.116
This means the jury must weigh any factors and evidence from
the guilt phase along with the aggravators and mitigators
presented at sentencing to determine whether the aggravators
outweigh the mitigators.117 Then, if the jury finds at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstances, the jury must impose a death sentence.118
During the sentencing phase jury deliberations in Blystone,
the jury asked for the definition of mitigation and was told that
mitigating factors are commonly understood.119 The judge, then,

112

Blystone, 494 U.S. at 301-02. But see generally Mem. of Law in
Supp. of Writ of Habeas Corpus for Pet’r Blystone, Blystone v. Horn, No.
99-490 (W.D. Pa. filed Mar. 29, 2000) (disputing many of the facts of the
case).
113
See Blystone v. Horn, Prelim. Pet. for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6.
Blystone’s lawyer was a part time-public defender with little experience,
funds, or assistance. Id. Each of these factors affects the outcome of capital
cases. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not
for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994)
(analyzing how the quality of representation determines whether a defendant
receives a death sentence).
114
Blystone, 494 U.S. at 306 n.4.
115
See 42 PA. CONS. ST. § 9711 (1998) (defining, explaining and
enumerating mitigating circumstances).
116
Id.
117
Id. at § 9711(c)(1)(iv).
118
Id. “[T]he verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously
finds at least one aggravating circumstance . . . and no mitigating
circumstance . . . . ” Id.
119
See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Writ of Habeas Corpus for Pet’r
Blystone at 64, Blystone v. Horn, No. 99-490 (W.D. Pa. filed Mar. 29,
2000).
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reread the initial instruction, which did not define mitigation.120
After further reviewing the evidence, the jury again asked about
the definition of mitigating factors and more specifically asked
the judge if they were required to sentence the defendant to death
if they found an aggravating factor and no mitigating factor, to
which the judge responded by rereading his initial jury
instructions.121 Arguably, individuals who ask whether a
particular act is required may not want to commit the act.
Therefore, one may conclude that the jury’s question was based
upon the hope of avoiding having to impose a death sentence.
Thus, the jury may have been asking the judge to resolve the
possible dilemma of either pretending to find the existence of an
aggravating circumstance in order to impose a life sentence or
imposing a death sentence when they did not believe death was
the appropriate sentence.122 Since the judge neither explained that
the desire to impose a life sentence may constitute mitigation nor
provided any other guidance, despite the apparent desire to spare
Blystone’s life, the jury sentenced him to death upon finding no
mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstance: he
“committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony.”123
Blystone
appealed
his
conviction,
claiming
that
Pennsylvania’s death penalty statute improperly limited the jury’s

120

Id.
Id.
122
See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 789 (2001) (discussing the
presumption that juries obey the laws and the impossible task of asking jurors
to choose between obeying the law as stated and imposing the sentence they
believe is most justified); see also supra note 16. The bifurcated system
employed in capital cases seems to prevent jury nullification from becoming a
viable option in capital cases. The sentencing phase and the guilt phase are
separate proceedings. Under this system, the jury determines whether a
defendant is guilty of capital murder prior to hearing any potentially mitigating
evidence. Therefore, a jury is not likely to find a defendant guilty of a lesser
offense in order to avoid imposing a death sentence because the jury usually
can impose a life sentence based upon the evidence presented at the sentencing
phase of a capital trial.
123
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 302 (1990); see also supra
note 111 (noting the factual uncertainties with respect to the Blystone case).
121
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discretion by requiring the jury to sentence him to death.124 The
magnitude of the claim and its potential impact upon the
sentences of other death row inmates drew a great deal of
attention,125 particularly after the Supreme Court agreed to hear
the case.126
In analyzing the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute,
the Supreme Court compared the mandatory portion of the statute
with the list of enumerated mitigating circumstances.127 The
Supreme Court concluded that the statute permitted the jury to
hear and evaluate all mitigating evidence because the “catch all”
124

Id. at 306.
See generally Steiker & Steiker, supra note 26 (discussing the
complexities of modern Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence and the
attention that is paid to death penalty cases).
126
494 U.S. 299 (1990).
127
Id. Compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (1998) (describing
the circumstances under which a death penalty is mandatory) with 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. at § 9711(e) (providing an inclusive list of mitigating
circumstances).
Mitigating circumstances—Mitigating circumstances shall include the
following:
125

(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal
convictions.
(2) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance.
(3) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired.
(4) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress . . . or acted under the
substantial domination of another person.
(6) The victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct
or consented to the homicidal acts.
(7) The defendant’s participation in the homicidal act was relatively
minor.
(8) Any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and
record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense.
Id.
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mitigating factor permits the presentation of “any other evidence
of mitigation concerning the character and record of the
defendant and the circumstances of his offense.”128 Moreover, the
Supreme Court concluded that the combination of the “catch all”
mitigator and the incorporation of the guilt phase of the trial into
the sentencing phase of the trial required the jury to consider and
evaluate the potentially mitigating circumstances in order to
determine whether mitigating evidence existed.129 Therefore, the
Supreme Court held that the mandatory aspect of Pennsylvania’s
death penalty statute did not limit the jury’s discretion since the
“catch all” provision afforded the jury a “vehicle for expressing
its reasoned moral response to [the mitigating] evidence in
rendering its sentencing decision.”130 As a result, the Supreme
Court upheld Blystone’s conviction as well as Pennsylvania’s
death penalty statute.131
B. Penry I and Penry II
In Penry v. Lynaugh,132 John Paul Penry, who was mentally
retarded,133 was charged and convicted of capital murder for the
128

Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990); see also 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. at § 9711(e)(8) (allowing a finding of “[a]ny other evidence of
mitigation”); infra Part IV (discussing the relation between Blystone and the
Penry cases and noting that the “catch all” mitigator is merely a codification
of the Lockett principle).
129
Blystone, 494 U.S. at 308-09; see also supra text accompanying notes
115-18 (explaining Pennsylvania’s death penalty scheme).
130
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989).
131
Blystone, 494 U.S. at 309.
132
492 U.S. 302 (1989). Penry’s conviction was reversed, resulting in his
retrial, re-conviction and, subsequent, appeal to the United States Supreme
Court in Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
133
Penry I, at 307-08. A full discussion of mental retardation and the
death penalty is beyond the scope of this article. It should be noted, however,
that the Supreme Court recently held that executing the mentally retarded
violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that in light
of evolving standards of decency, as exemplified by the growing trend among
states to pass legislation barring the execution of a mentally retarded person,
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brutal rape and murder of a young woman.134 At the sentencing
phase, Penry’s lawyer introduced extensive evidence concerning
Penry’s mental retardation and the abuse he suffered as a child.135
Despite the Lockett principle that a jury must consider any and all
mitigating circumstances,136 the Penry I jury was never instructed
that it could consider Penry’s mental retardation and abuse in
determining his sentence.137 Moreover, Texas law, at the time of
the first two Penry cases, required the judge to impose the death
penalty if the sentencing body affirmatively answers three
statutorily required questions:138 1) “whether the conduct of the
defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of
the deceased or another would result;”139 2) “whether there was a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society;”140
and 3) “whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any,

this country can no longer stand for the execution of mentally challenged
individuals); see also Death Penalty Information Center, Mental Retardation
and the Death Penalty (providing comprehensive information pertaining to
mental retardation and the death penalty), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
dpicmr.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2002).
134
Penry I, 492 U.S. at 307.
135
Id. Penry was in and out of hospitals as a child and had an I.Q. below
63, which resulted in part from severe beatings as a child. Id. at 307-09.
Moreover, Penry was repeatedly locked in his room without access to a toilet
for long periods of time and had scars from frequent beatings with a belt. Id.
At Penry’s trial, the defense psychiatrist testified that “anyone with [Penry’s]
I.Q. is always incompetent.” Id.
136
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); see also McKoy v. North
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
137
Penry I, 492 U.S. at 310-312.
138
Id. at 310, citing, TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b) (Vernon
1981 & Supp. 1989); see also infra infra note 151 (explaining the 1991
amendment to the Texas death penalty statute).
139
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp.
1989).
140
Id.
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by the deceased.”141 Penry’s jury answered each of these
questions in the affirmative and thereby required the judge to
impose a death sentence.142
Penry appealed his death sentence on the ground that the
statute violated Lockett by not allowing the jury to consider
relevant mitigating evidence.143 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and concluded that the three statutorily mandated
questions did not adequately address the mitigating evidence of
Penry’s mental retardation because a jury could reasonably
consider Penry’s mental retardation as requiring an affirmative
answer to one of the three statutory questions even if the jury
desired to spare Penry’s life.144 Thus, in essence, Penry’s mental
retardation could be construed as an aggravating circumstance
rather than a mitigating circumstance.145 Moreover, the Supreme
Court concluded that the trial judge did nothing to correct this
problem.146 The Supreme Court then held that “a reasonable juror
could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing
the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death
based upon his mitigating evidence.”147 Consequently, the
Supreme Court reversed Penry’s conviction.148
In 1990, the state of Texas retried Penry and a jury found
him guilty of capital murder for a second time.149 At the
sentencing phase, Penry’s lawyer, again, offered strong evidence

141

Id.
Penry I, 492 U.S. 302, 310 (1989).
143
Id. at 313. Penry’s counsel phrased the issue by stating that Penry’s
death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because “the jury was not
adequately instructed to take into consideration all of his mitigating evidence
and because the terms in the Texas ‘special issues’ [portion of the death
penalty statute] were not defined in such a way that the jury could consider
and give effect to his mitigating evidence in answering [the ‘special issues’].”
Id.
144
Id. at 320-23.
145
See id.
146
See id. at 320-28.
147
Id. at 326.
148
Id. at 323.
149
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
142
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of Penry’s mental retardation and child abuse.150 Despite the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Penry I, at the time of Penry’s second
trial, Texas still employed the same three statutory questions in
determining whether to impose a death sentence.151 In attempting
to address the Supreme Court’s concern in Penry I, the trial
judge told Penry’s second jury:
You are instructed that when you deliberate on the
questions posed in the special issues, you are to consider
mitigating circumstances, if any, supported by the
evidence presented in both phases of the trial . . . . If you
determine, when giving effect to the mitigating evidence,
if any, that a life sentence, is an appropriate response to
the personal culpability of the defendant, a negative
finding should be given to one of the special issues.152
After deliberating for more than two hours, the jury answered
each of the three questions affirmatively, resulting in the judge
imposing the required death sentence.153
For a second time, Penry appealed his death sentence. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
judge’s supplemental instructions complied with the mandates of

150

Penry I, 492 U.S. at 307-11. As a child, Penry suffered from organic
brain impairment and had an I.Q. hovering around sixty, meaning he had the
mentality of a six-year-old. Id. at 308. In addition, Penry suffered numerous
beatings, including instances where his mother beat him over the head with a
belt buckle, resulting in brain injuries. Id. at 309; see also supra note 135
(discussing the abuse Penry suffered as a child).
151
See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(d)(1) (Supp. 1991). In
1991, Texas amended its death penalty statute by repealing the third statutory
question and adding:
[I]n deliberating on the [statutory questions], [the jury] shall consider
all evidence admitted at the guilt or innocence stage and the
punishment stage, including evidence of the defendant’s background
or character or the circumstances of the offense that militates for or
mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty.
Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 138-41 (enumerating the statutory
questions employed in Texas death penalty cases at the time of Penry’s trials).
152
Penry II, 532 U.S. at 790.
153
Id.
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Penry I.154 Prior to directly addressing this issue, the Supreme
Court clarified its holding in Penry I by stating that merely
informing the jury that they may consider mitigating
circumstances is not enough to ensure that the jury also has a
“vehicle” to give effect to mitigating evidence in determining
whether to impose a death sentence.155 The Supreme Court then
directly addressed whether the supplemental instruction satisfied
the principle of Penry I as the Court had just clarified it.156 After
commenting that an instruction inviting the jury to do something
contrary to the instruction poses an ethical dilemma to the jury,
the Court held that inviting the jury to disregard the law violates
the constitution.157 Therefore, the mere existence of a statute or,
in Penry’s case, an instruction allowing the jury to consider
mitigation is not necessarily enough to grant the jury a “vehicle”
to give effect to the relevant mitigating evidence, particularly
when the statute restricts the scope of the jury’s consideration of
mitigating evidence or confuses the jury about the manner in
which they can use the mitigating evidence in determining
whether a death sentence is appropriate.158 As a result, the
Supreme Court concluded that, despite the facial validity of the
Texas death penalty statute,159 under the circumstances
154

Id. at 787.
Id. at 792.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 793. The Supreme Court viewed the supplemental instruction as
the equivalent of instructing the jury to disregard the law since none of the
three questions pertained to mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance.
Id. at 799-803.
158
See generally id.
159
See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding the Texas death
penalty statute despite the provision requiring the jury to answer three
statutorily mandated questions rather than permitting the jury to weigh the
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances or impose a
life sentence at will). The Texas statute permitted the consideration of
mitigation in answering the three statutory questions. See generally id.; see
also, TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b) (Supp. 1989). Texas still
employs the “special issues” questions as the means to determine whether to
sentence a defendant to death. TEX. CRIM. PROC.CODE ANN. § 37.071(b)
(Supp. 1991).
155
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surrounding Penry’s case, a “reasonable juror could well have
believed there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry
did not deserve to be sentenced to death . . . .”160 Therefore, the
court reversed Penry’s conviction for the second time.161
III. STUDIES PERTAINING TO A JURY’S ABILITY TO
AND APPLY RELEVANT MITIGATING EVIDENCE

UNDERSTAND

A backbone principle of the American justice system is the
jury’s ability to follow and apply the law.162 Obviously, this
principle is successful only if juries understand the instructions
that the judge reads to them. There has long been concern about
how a person with no knowledge of the law can follow the
complicated language and rules stated by a judge.163 This concern

160

Penry II, 532 U.S. at 788, quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
326 (1989).
161
Penry II, 532 U.S. at 796. The State of Texas decided to seek the
death penalty against John Penry for a third time. See Michael Graczyk, Third
Sentencing Hearing Set for Mentally Retarded Death Row Inmate in Texas,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Apr. 29, 2002. During the sentencing phase
of Penry’s third trial, the United States Supreme Court handed down their
decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), barring the execution of
the mentally retarded. In light of this decision, the state of Texas argued that,
despite evidence of childhood trauma and a low I.Q., there was little
conclusive evidence to prove that Penry was mentally retarded, claiming that
mental retardation could be faked. See Harvey Rice, Penry Sentenced 3rd
Time to Die: Jury Rejects Argument for Retardation, HOUS. CHRON., July 4,
2002, at 1; Nightline (ABC television broadcast, July 11, 2002) (discussing the
recent prohibition against executing the mentally retarded while focusing on
the Penry case, including interviewing Joe Price, the district attorney who
prosecuted all three Penry cases). On July 3, 2002, a jury sentenced John
Penry to death for a third time, thus, opening the door for a possible third
Penry decision from the United States Supreme Court. Id.
162
See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) (discussing the
presumption that juries follow instructions).
163
Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on
Death by Revising and Testing Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224 (1996)
(discussing studies of juror comprehension from the Zeisel study in the early
1990s and the Chicago Jury Project in the late 1950s). The Zeisel study asked
specific questions pertaining to mitigation to potential jurors who were waiting
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has become even greater now that juries are expected to
understand and apply complicated schemes pertaining to
mitigating and aggravating evidence prior to passing judgment
upon the life of another human being.164 As a result, researchers
have begun to undertake comprehensive studies to better
comprehend the jury’s ability to understand the confusing law of
mitigation.165
A. Capital Jury Project
The Capital Jury Project attempts to determine the extent to
which jurors understand instructions in capital cases while also
making recommendations for improving a jury’s understanding of
the applicable law and instructions.166 A group of researchers
from the Capital Jury Project interviewed 916 capital jurors in
in the courthouse. Id. at 225-29. The study concluded that 48% of jurors
misunderstood the concept of mitigation. Id. at 230. The results of the
Chicago Jury Project are reported in Harry Kalven, Jr., & Hans Zeisel, THE
AMERICAN JURY (1966). See also Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate
Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Luncheon Address before the
National Conference on Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice System
(May 15, 1999) (acknowledging the problem of jury confusion, stating that
jurors are “read a virtually incomprehensible set of instructions and sent into
the jury room to reach a verdict in a case they may not understand much better
than they did before the trial began”).
164
See, e.g., California Pattern Jury Instructions, CA CALJIC § 8.85
(1996). “A mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition or event which does
not constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in question, but may be
considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the appropriateness
of the death penalty.” Id.; Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal, ILCS
7C.06 (2000) (referring to mitigating factors vaguely by stating that mitigating
factors are reasons why the defendant should not be sentenced to death);
Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions-Criminal, OUJI-CR § 4-78 (2001).
“Mitigating circumstances are those which, in fairness, sympathy, and mercy,
may extenuate or reduce the degree of moral culpability or blame.” Id.; see
also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 26 (discussing the complexities of current
death penalty law).
165
See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 101 at 1044-45 (explaining the
reasoning for undertaking the Capital Jury Project).
166
Id.
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eleven states.167 The overwhelming evidence resulting from this
study demonstrates that juries do not understand the concepts of
aggravation and mitigation, and do not follow the instructions of
the court. 168
As part of the study undertaken by the Capital Jury Project,
jurors were questioned about specific aspects of mitigation.169
Almost twenty-five percent of these jurors believed they could
only consider the enumerated list of mitigating factors.170 Fortytwo percent of the jurors incorrectly believed they had to
unanimously agree to the existence of the mitigating factor.171
167

Id.
See William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital
Sentencing: Juror’s Predispositions, Attitudes and Premature DecisionMaking, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 1477 (1998) (discussing how capital
jurors disregard judges’ instructions by deciding the sentence prior to the
commencement of the sentencing phase of the trial); Diamond & Levi, supra
note 163, at 225 (finding that few Illinois jurors understood that they could
consider mitigating factors not specifically enumerated by the trial judge);
Eisenberg et al., supra note 101, at 360 (finding “[n]early one-third of jurors
were under the mistaken impression that the law required a death sentence if
they found heinousness or dangerousness”); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T.
Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instruction in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 10 (1993) (finding that “[t]wenty percent of the jurors on death juries
believe that an aggravating factor can be established by preponderance of the
evidence or only to a juror’s personal satisfaction”); James Luginbuhl & Julie
Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?,
70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1167 (1995) (finding that “[j]urors were confused about
the burden of proof and unanimity was poor”). Only fifty-nine percent
understood that they could consider any evidence they desired as a mitigating
factor. Id.; see also James Frank & Brandon K. Applegate, Assessing Juror
Understanding of Capital Sentencing Instructions, 44 CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY NO. 3 (1988). A mock jury study revealed that juror
comprehension of sentencing instructions is limited, especially with regard to
mitigation. Id.
169
See supra note 168.
170
Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 168, at 1165-69. See Hitchcock v.
Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987). This view held by the jurors violates Supreme
Court jurisprudence requiring the sentencing body to consider non-statutory
mitigating factors. Id.
171
Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 168, at 1165-69. This belief held by
the jurors is an incorrect application of Supreme Court precedence. See Mills
168
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The most disturbing finding was that forty-eight percent of the
jurors polled said they chose the death penalty despite conceding
that the factors opposing the death penalty were stronger than the
factors in support of the death penalty.172 Finally, more than
twenty-five percent of those interviewed thought death was
mandatory when it was not,173 and more than half failed to
recognize situations in which life was mandated, such as where
the jury failed to find the existence of any aggravating
circumstance.174
Pennsylvania provides an appropriate example. According to
the Capital Jury Project, nineteen percent of Pennsylvania jurors
interviewed concluded during the guilt phase that life
imprisonment was the appropriate punishment for the defendant,
although they later imposed a sentence of death.175 The juror’s
admitted that their initial determination that life imprisonment
was the appropriate sentence was based on the belief that the
crime was not sufficiently heinous or gruesome to warrant
death.176 Pennsylvania law allows a jury to impose a death
sentence only if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances; therefore, a finding of a lack of
gruesomeness could result in a life sentence.177 These jurors,
however, still chose to impose a death sentence.178 This evidence
demonstrates the point that juries fail to understand mitigation

v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (holding that a unanimity requirement for
mitigating circumstances violates the Lockett principle that the sentencing body
must be able to consider all relevant mitigating evidence).
172
Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 168, at 1165-69.
173
Id.; see also Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms
of Moral Disengagement and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 1447, 1451 (1997) (stating that “[w]hen jurors are repeatedly asked
whether they can follow the law and impose the death penalty, they begin to
believe the law actually requires them to reach death verdicts”).
174
Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 168, at 1165-69.
175
See Bowers et al., supra note 168 at 1488, table 1.
176
Id. at 1500.
177
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (1998) (requiring that a death sentence
may only be imposed if aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors).
178
See Bowers et al., supra note 168 at 1488-90.

BARRONFINALMACRO3-27.DOC

INSTRUCTING MITIGATION

4/1/03 2:30 PM

243

and, therefore, impose a death sentence upon defendants jurors
do not believe deserve to be put to death.179
The bifurcated system is one proposed way of addressing this
problem, since bifurcated trials are often employed to ensure that
evidence pertaining to sentencing does not infect the guilt phase
and that juries consider only the evidence presented at sentencing
in determining whether to spare a defendant’s life.180 Even in this
context, however, studies by the Capital Jury Project show that
many jurors decide the appropriate sentence during the guilt
phase of the trial.181 Thus, in addition to finding that jurors make
uninformed decisions, the Capital Jury Project reveals they do so
many times prematurely.182
B. Additional Studies
As evidenced by the numerous occasions in which juries have
asked the judge to help them understand mitigation, a jury’s
inability to understand mitigation is a common situation in death
penalty trials.183 In many of these cases, juries either asked the

179

Id.; See also Mem. of Law in Supp. of Writ of Habeas Corpus for
Pet’r Blystone at 64, Blystone v. Horn, No. 99-490 (W.D. Pa. filed Mar. 29,
2000).
180
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
181
See, e.g., Bowers et al., supra note 168, at 1477, 1488 (stating that
interviews with capital jurors in 11 states revealed that almost half believed
they knew what the punishment should be before the sentencing phase of the
trial).
182
See generally Bowers et al., supra note 168.
183
See Berlow, Deadly Decisions, supra note 1 (quoting the jury
foreman, Fred Baca). One of the most disturbing examples is the case of
Bobby Moore. According to a post-trial interview with the jury foreman, the
jury asked the judge to “tell them which evidence could be considered as
mitigating, but the question went unanswered so often that they finally stopped
asking.” Id.; see also, Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 424, 431 (Mo. 2002) In
Deck, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed a death sentence on grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object when the judge responded
to the jury’s inquiry regarding the “legal definition of mitigating
circumstances” by saying, “any terms that you have not had defined for you
should be given the ordinary meaning.” Id. at 424. The judge then denied the
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judge to define aggravation and mitigation,184 or took it upon
themselves to consult a dictionary.185 At least one Supreme Court
justice has found this problematic because “mitigating evidence is
a term of art, with a constitutional meaning that is unlikely to be
apparent to a lay jury.”186 The majority of the Supreme Court,
however, has held that aggravation and mitigation are ordinary
words that do not have to be defined.187
To further support the proposition that jurors do not
understand the concept of aggravation and mitigation, researchers
compiled a list of instructions from actual death penalty cases,
along with questions asked by jurors while deliberating in capital
cases.188 Based on this list, and in conjunction with general
jury’s request for a dictionary. Id. at 431. See also People v. Lang, 782 P.2d
627 (Cal. 1989) (discussing the trial judge’s decision to respond to the jury’s
inquiry about the meaning of aggravation and mitigation by reading the
dictionary definitions of the terms), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990); People
v. Adcox, 763 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1988) (discussing whether a judge, in response
to the jury’s request for a definition of aggravation and mitigation, can define
aggravation and mitigation by reading from Corpus Juris Secundum), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1038 (1990); People v. McLain, 757 P.2d 569 (Cal. 1988)
(discussing the jury’s request for a definition of aggravation and mitigation),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1972 (1989); People v. Hamilton, 756 P.2d 1348 (Cal.
1988) (discussing the jury asking the judge to read them the definition of
aggravation and mitigation on three occasions during deliberations), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1040 (1989); State v. Jones, 451 S.E.2d 826 (N.C. 1998)
(upholding a death sentence despite the judge reading to the jury the American
Heritage Dictionary’s definition of “mitigate”).
184
See McLain, 757 P.2d at 580 (upholding a conviction despite the jury
requesting a definition of aggravation and mitigation to which the judge asked
whether they wanted the legal or ordinary definition while telling the jury no
legal definition of these terms existed); Hamilton, 756 P.2d at 1362 (upholding
a conviction where the jury asked for the instructions to be read to them three
times and asked for a definition of mitigation in layman’s terms to which the
judge responded by reciting the definition from a legal dictionary).
185
See People v. Karis, 758 P.2d 1189 (Cal. 1987) (upholding a
conviction despite a juror using a dictionary to obtain the definition of
mitigation), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 (1988).
186
Watkins v. Murray, 493 U.S. 907, 910 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
187
Id. at 908-09.
188
See Bowers, supra note 101, at 1044-45 (discussing the manner in
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constitutional principles pertaining to mitigation, researchers
posed questions to a random sampling of the population.189 The
results were astounding. The first question asked whether jurors
could spare a person’s life if they found a mitigating factor not
mentioned by the judge.190 An overwhelming sixty-four percent
of the people polled incorrectly believed this was insufficient to
prevent the imposition of a death sentence.191 The second
question used an instruction that was given in a capital trial in
reference to a weighing statute.192 The people polled were asked
whether they had to impose a death sentence if they reached the
conclusion that the mitigating evidence outweighed the
aggravating evidence, but felt they were unable to find a
mitigating factor that was sufficient to preclude the death
penalty.193 An overwhelming fifty-eight percent of the people
wrongly believed a death sentence had to be imposed.194
The statistical analysis discussed above and the responses to
which the data was compiled).
189
Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 168, at 1162-70 (discussing jurors’
inability to correctly respond to questions pertaining to the law of mitigation);
see also Diamond & Levi, supra note 163, at 230-33 (discussing the results of
the Zeisel survey); Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving
the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17
LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 153 (1982) (finding comprehension of jury instructions
by college students generally poor); Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G.
Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C.
L. REV. 77 (1988) (observing the low comprehension level of pattern
instructions by people called to jury service in Texas); Tiersma, supra note 9,
at 1 (discussing jurors’ ability to understand instructions given in capital trials
by posing these questions to members of the population who had not heard the
questions in the past nor served on a capital jury).
190
Luginbuhl and Howe, supra note 168, at 1165-68.
191
Id. All death penalty statutes and Supreme Court jurisprudence require
the jury to consider all evidence offered in mitigation prior to imposing a
death sentence. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that non-statutory mitigators, which
normally would not be mentioned by the judge, can be presented to and
considered by the jury. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
192
Luginbuhl and Howe, supra note 168, at 1165-68.
193
Id.
194
Id.
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actual instructions and issues from real cases indicate a disturbing
trend among juries in capital cases: an inability to follow the law
that is based on a clear misunderstanding of what the law
requires. That is, the Supreme Court has held that the presence
of an aggravating factor is merely a threshold requirement to
make a defendant eligible for the death penalty.195 Nevertheless,
many jurors erroneously believe a death sentence is required.196
Furthermore, data suggests that the problem of jurors not
understanding the law and not following jury instructions is more
than an academic concern, because an overwhelming number of
jurors “seem not to understand what they are to do with such
evidence.”197 Moreover, in some instances, jurors “recognize that
evidence in mitigation has been presented, but do not know what
the law allows, or requires them to do with such evidence,”198 as
was illustrated by more than fifty percent of jurors making the
contradictory statement that mitigating evidence outweighed the
aggravating evidence but was not sufficient to spare a defendant’s
life.199
IV. ELEVEN YEARS LATER, PENRY II ACHIEVED THE
RECOGNITION BLYSTONE DESERVED
Both the principles of American society and the United States
Constitution are based upon the fundamental belief that the rights
of an individual should be protected from the opposition of the

195

Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994); see also Steiker &
Steiker, supra note 26 (discussing the threshold requirement to impose a death
sentence).
196
Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death:
Guilt is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; And Mitigation is No
Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011 (2002) (discussing jury misconceptions
about the sentencing phase of a capital case); see also, Bowers, supra note
101, at 1091 n.32. (finding that “many jurors believe that the death penalty is
mandatory” when an aggravating circumstance is present).
197
Bentele & Bowers, supra note 196, at 1042.
198
Id. at 1043.
199
Id.

BARRONFINALMACRO3-27.DOC

INSTRUCTING MITIGATION

4/1/03 2:30 PM

247

masses.200 For most of American history, however, this principle
has not found its way into the criminal justice system.201
Defendants were punished without any consideration of the
reason why they committed the crime.202 Until recently, in
determining the appropriate sentence, the sentencing body did not
consider any aspect of the defendant’s life that would have made
him less culpable.203 In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court began
to recognize the inherent unfairness of imposing a sentence
without considering the uniqueness of the individual defendant.204
In an attempt to eradicate the problem of arbitrarily imposed
sentences, the Court adopted individualized sentencing.205 Despite
criticism that individualized sentencing is contradictory to the
aversion of arbitrary and capriciously imposed death sentences,206

200

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 81 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.,
1961) (discussing the need for the Constituion in order to protect individuals
against the inherent problem of majoritarian government); see also Bedau,
supra note 26 (explaining the reasoning for current death penalty laws and the
high level of support for the death penalty in the United States in contrast to
that of most of the rest of the world).
201
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the
right to counsel to the states and marking the beginning of the individual rights
movement within the criminal context and the application of the Bill of Rights
to the states).
202
See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam)
(invalidating the death penalty partly because the failure to consider why an
individual committed the crime gave the jury untrammeled discretion to
determine who would be sentenced to death and, therefore, resulted in the
arbitrary infliction of capital punishment).
203
Id.
204
See id.
205
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (discussing
what has now become known as individualized sentencing when the Court
referred to the necessity and requirement that a jury consider all “relevant
aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the
imposition upon him of a sentence of death” and “the circumstances of the
particular offense”).
206
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 714-15 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (explaining why he no longer can reconcile the Lockett Doctrine
with the concern over arbitrary sentencing as expressed in Furman); see Scott
E. Sundy, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided
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the Supreme Court has strictly adhered to its application.207 The
Supreme Court, however, has failed to ensure that the
individualized sentencing process is applied in a manner that
guarantees the underlying principle that each person will be
treated as uniquely individual human beings.”208
The Supreme Court has consistently stated that the sentencing
body must be able and willing to consider all relevant mitigating
evidence at sentencing in order to avoid a sentence that is both
arbitrary and capricious.209 This right is meaningless, however, if
the sentencing body is unable or incapable of giving effect to this
evidence in determining a sentence.210 Therefore, implicit within
the reasoning of Lockett, in order for a death sentence to pass
constitutional muster, juries must be able to understand and
recognize mitigation and know what the law requires them to do
with any mitigating evidence they have found.211 Unfortunately,
many juries are unable to accomplish these tasks.212
The problem of a jury failing to understand the law of
mitigation was first presented to the Supreme Court in
Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1185 (1991)
(noting that the choice between these two principles depends on choosing
between the risk of a death sentence based on an arbitrary factor and the risk
of one imposed because mitigating evidence was excluded).
207
See Bilionis, supra note 9, at 283.
208
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
209
See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (requiring the sentencing
body to consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances prior to
imposing a death sentence); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
(invalidating Georgia’s death penalty scheme because the manner in which
defendant’s were selected for the death penalty was arbitrary and capricious).
210
See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (requiring the
sentencer’s guidance be channeled by “clear and objective standards that
provide specified detailed guidance”).
211
See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-03 (2001); see also Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (establishing that new rules of criminal
procedure cannot be made on a habeas case). Since this right falls within the
principles of the Lockett Doctrine, it is not a new rule of criminal procedure.
See Lockett, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Thus, the Teague Doctrine, which prevents
creating new rules on a habeas case, has no impact.
212
See supra Part III.B (discussing the jury’s inability to understand and
adequately apply the principles of individualized sentencing).
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Blystone.213 Although unique in many respects, this case is
perhaps most interesting for what was missing. 214 Blystone’s
lawyer interpreted the statute as unconstitutional on its face,215
arguing that the statute mandating the death penalty prevented the
jury from considering mitigating evidence.216 Instead Blystone’s
lawyer should have challenged whether the jury was capable of
understanding and recognizing relevant mitigating evidence along
with correctly applying the law to the relevant mitigating
evidence.217 Due to the manner in which Blystone’s lawyer
presented the issue, the Supreme Court never had the opportunity
to address the jury’s ability to understand mitigation and apply
the law to any mitigating evidence that they found.218
After Blystone, litigation focused on whether juries were
permitted to give effect to relevant mitigating evidence, rather
than whether juries were capable of giving effect to relevant
mitigating evidence.219 Additionally, when the issue of what to do
about juries that did not understand the law of mitigation was
eventually raised, the battle appeared lost when, in Buchanan v.
Angelone,220 the Supreme Court held that juries neither need to be
instructed on the concept of mitigating evidence generally nor on
particular statutory mitigating factors.221 In Buchanan, however,
213

Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990).
See supra Part II (discussing Blystone’s unusual facts and applicable
statutory provisions)
215
Blystone, 494 U.S. at 302.
216
Id.
217
Cf. id. Since Pennsylvania’s death penalty statute clearly required the
consideration of mitigating evidence in order to determine whether mitigating
evidence existed, the real issue was whether the jury understood how to
consider any potential mitigating evidence. Id.; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 9711 (1998) (providing the requirements to impose a death sentence).
218
See generally Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990).
219
See, e.g., Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001). While the Supreme
Court’s opinion addressed the broader issue this note addresses, the case was
presented to the Court as dealing with whether the supplemental instruction
pertaining to mental retardation permitted the jury to consider mental
retardation as mitigating evidence. Id.
220
522 U.S. 269 (1998).
221
Id. (discussing whether a judge must specifically instruct a jury on the
214
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the jury did not express confusion pertaining to the meaning of
mitigation or a desire to not sentence the defendant to death.222
Therefore, the Supreme Court again avoided dealing with the
issue.223
The Supreme Court finally dealt with the issue indirectly in
Penry v. Johnson.224 Thus, the Court differentiated between
Blystone and Penry II. Despite the different results in the cases,
the two cases are not inconsistent. Blystone merely addressed a
facial challenge to a death penalty statute on the basis that the
statute prevented the jury from considering mitigation.225 As
such, Blystone was correctly decided because the statute required
the jury to conclude, prior to imposing a death sentence, that
mitigation either did or did not exist. Therefore, in determining
that there was no valid mitigating evidence in support of
Blystone, the jury had to consider the evidence presented at the
guilt/innocence phase before considering any evidence presented
at the sentencing phase.226 Thus, the Supreme Court correctly
concluded that, on its face, the Pennsylvania statute met the
constitutional mandate of Lockett. 227
The Supreme Court, however, was unable to build upon the
reasoning of Blystone in Penry II because the latter case raised an
“as applied” statutory challenge based on the Lockett principle.228
law of mitigation when the jury has not expressed any confusion nor asked for
an instruction on mitigation).
222
See id.
223
See generally id.
224
532 U.S. 782 (2001). Research has found that the number of cases
raising issues pertaining to confused juries drastically decreased after
Buchanan.
225
See generally Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990).
226
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711. This statute, which was at issue in
Blystone, requires the entire guilt/innocence phase of the trial to be
incorporated into the sentencing phase. Thus, any aspect of the guilt/innocence
phase of trial could be considered sufficient mitigation to spare the defendant’s
life. Id.
227
See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 (1978).
228
See generally Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); Penry
v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
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Lockett stood for the principle that juries cannot be prevented
from considering mitigating evidence, and must be willing and
capable of considering mitigating evidence during the sentencing
phase in order to ensure that each defendant receives an
individualized sentence.229 Thus, analysis under Lockett is a three
step process.230 First, the defendant must be permitted to present
all mitigating evidence.231 Second, the jury must be permitted to
consider the mitigating evidence.232 Third, the jury must be able
to understand and recognize mitigation while also knowing what
the law requires them to do with the mitigating evidence once
they have found it.233 The first two aspects, but not the third,
were addressed adequately in Blystone.234 The third step of the
Lockett principle, however, was at issue in Penry II.235
As in Blystone, the Penry II jury had to consider the
mitigating evidence presented at both the guilt phase and
sentencing phase in order to determine whether mitigating
circumstances existed.236 As a result, the Texas death penalty
statute, on its face, permitted the consideration of mitigating
evidence, so the statute could not be considered unconstitutional
across the board. The Supreme Court, however, did not end its
analysis of the Texas death penalty statute here. Instead, the
Supreme Court addressed the statute as it was applied to Penry’s
229

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); see also Part I(C) (discussing
the Lockett Doctrine).
230
See generally Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
231
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (reversing a death
sentence because the judge refused to allow the defendant to offer evidence of
his good behavior while in prison).
232
Id. (holding that the sentencing body cannot be precluded from
considering any mitigating evidence).
233
Cf. Penry II, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (reversing a death sentence because
the jury was not clearly instructed on what sentence could be imposed if the
jury found the defendant’s mental retardation mitigating).
234
See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) (holding that
the Pennsylvania death penalty statute permitted the defendant to present and
the jury to hear all relevant mitigating evidence).
235
See Penry II, 532 U.S. at 803-04.
236
See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b) (enumerating the
procedures in a capital case).
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specific characteristics, particularly his mental retardation.237 As
a result, in Penry II, the Supreme Court was able to reach the
correct conclusion under Lockett without having to overturn
Blystone.238
While admitting that the Texas death penalty statute, on its
face, was constitutional, the Supreme Court recognized that
Lockett’s mandate that the jury be permitted to hear relevant
mitigating evidence is rendered meaningless when the jury is
unable to give effect to the mitigating evidence that is
presented.239 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that death
penalty statutes permitting the jury to consider all mitigating
evidence are still unconstitutional under Lockett when a
“reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no
vehicle for expressing the view that [the defendant] did not
deserve to be sentenced to death.”240 Thus, Penry II confirmed
that challenges to a death sentence on the basis of the jury’s
consideration of mitigating evidence must be addressed under the
three-prong test discussed supra.241
In order to satisfy the requirement set forth in Penry II, the
jury must be able to understand the law of mitigation, recognize
mitigating evidence when it is presented, and know what the law
requires them to do with this evidence once they have found it.242
Unfortunately, it is impossible to analyze each individual juror to
ensure the ability to accomplish these tasks. Therefore, the
system necessarily operates under the presumption that juries
understand the law as explained to them by the judge, including
the instructions pertaining to mitigation.243 As the statistical
237

See Penry II, 532 U.S. 803-04.
Id.; see also Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Arguably, the Supreme Court would have
reached the same conclusion in Blystone as it did in Penry II if the statute was
addressed as applied to the defendant rather than as a facial challenge.
239
See Penry II, 532 U.S. 803-04.
240
Id. at 791.
241
Id.; see also supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text (discussing the
three-prong test).
242
See generally Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
243
See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) (discussing the
238
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analysis discussed in Part III of this note illustrates, though,
many jurors are confused about the law of mitigation.244
Admittedly, this problem is not easily remedied. Penry II,
however, mandates that this problem be addressed when a juror
has either expressly or impliedly indicated that he or she does not
have a strong enough understanding of mitigation to ensure they
impose a sentence that complies with constitutional mandates.245
At a minimum, to ensure that the defendant’s death sentence is
constitutional under Penry II, judges must give specific guidance
to juries who express confusion on the law of mitigation.246 Only
this safeguard will protect a defendant from an erroneous
sentence due to a juror’s mistaken belief that they had not found
mitigation where mitigating evidence actually existed.
CONCLUSION
During the past thirty-five years, death sentences have been
called into question at an alarming rate.247 Thus, every effort
should be made to ensure that the death penalty is more reliable
at preventing people who do not deserve to be sentenced to death
from receiving a death sentence. As was demonstrated by the
presumption that juries follow instructions).
244
See supra Part III (discussing juror confusion).
245
Penry II, 532 U.S. at 803-04.
246
See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002) (holding that all findings
of fact that could enhance a defendant’s sentence must be made by the jury).
The importance of juries understanding mitigating evidence and correctly
applying the law to the facts should take on greater significance in light of this
United States Supreme Court’s ruling that juries must make findings of fact in
capital cases.
247
See James Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital
Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1846-50 (2000) (discussing the
extremely high error rate in capital cases and the underlying reasons behind
these errors). Almost two-thirds of all death sentences are reversed either on
direct appeal or in collateral post-conviction proceedings. Id.; see also` United
States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding the
federal death penalty unconstitutional in light of the likelihood that an innocent
person could be sentenced to death and precluded from establishing his
innocence).
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empirical studies discussed in Part III, juries’ inability to
understand the law of mitigation strongly contributes to the
number of invalid death sentences. Therefore, requiring a judge
to provide guidance to juries that are confused about the law of
mitigation would substantially decrease the number of defendants
wrongfully sentenced to death. These instructions are only one of
many improvements within the criminal justice system that are
necessary to ensure that an individual gets a fair trial. In light of
the gravity and irreversibility of correcting a wrong sentence
once an individual has been executed, however, this minimum
safeguard must be employed. As long as the government
continues to sanction the death penalty and allow the criminal
justice system to take a person’s life, it is certainly not too much
to ask that these judicially-imposed safeguards be properly
applied.

